1. Introduction

[1.1] "Dark red is also red," as often remarked by Chinese netizens, captures the essence of the contemporary attention economy—the phrase plays on a Chinese idiom in which red signifies fame, with dark red denoting a notoriety that, while negative in character, still generates visibility and thus influence. In the social media era, the attention economy manifests itself through datafication, or "the transformation of social behavior into quantifiable online data, enabling real-time tracking and predictive analysis" (van Dijck 2014, 198). A celebrity's popularity and commercial value can be directly quantified through the datafication of interaction metrics (Kosterich 2016; He and Li 2023). Therefore, fandom has become more and more vital to media industries nowadays. Mel Stanfill's Exploiting Fandom (2019) conceptualizes fandom as a generalized mode of engagement in the age of social media in which the entertainment industry actively cultivates fan communities that are both more valuable and more manageable.

[1.2] Within this context, Mai Lin, an ordinary woman with no prior celebrity background, rose to sudden prominence through her participation in the Chinese reality show See You Again (2024–25). The program followed three couples facing marital crises who embarked on an eighteen-day road trip in an effort to rekindle their love and repair their relationships. Mai Lin's controversial behavior during the show soon became a focal point of online debate, triggering widespread ridicule, personal attacks, and even organized boycotts. Her experience exemplifies how the profit mechanisms of visibility and circulation related to antifans can operate independently of positive reputation and how notoriety itself may become a form of economic value.

[1.3] I argue for the necessity of examining online audiences from the perspective of antifandom—a mode of engagement that embodies a seemingly paradoxical logic: Despite their aversion, antifans remain highly attentive and emotionally invested, participating actively in discourse production, content creation, and even consumption behaviors. This analysis of the evolution of antifan attitudes and discourses surrounding Mai Lin demonstrates that the conceptual framework of the fan economy is equally applicable to antifan communities and their cyclical dynamics. Particular attention is paid to the sociocultural factors that both influence and are influenced by the emergence of the antifan economy in contemporary Chinese digital culture.

[1.4] The aim of introducing the term "antifan economy" is to foreground its distinct mode of operation and to address the increasingly blurred boundaries of contemporary fan culture (Stanfill 2019). The term serves to differentiate antifandom from conventional fandom, which is grounded in admiration and love. Therefore, the term conceptualizes antifandom's autonomous commercial logic and economic circulation. It operates through the symbolic circulation of notoriety and the sustained conversion between cultural and economic capital, thereby enabling the direct monetization of negative affect.

2. Fan economy

[2.1] Fiske (2002) analyzes how capital is accumulated in fan cultures. He distinguishes official cultural capital, which refers to cultural resources and forms of taste that depend on institutional validation, from popular cultural capital, which is more closely associated with fan cultures. Popular cultural capital denotes those cultural resources that emerge from everyday practices and are collectively recognized and valued within specific cultural communities. One particular form, the fan gift economy, is established at the intersection of popular cultural capital and economic capital under media industrialization. Turk (2014) sees fan gift economy as a community-oriented system of cultural exchange in which fan works circulate as shareable gifts, privileging collective access and ongoing circulation over direct, individualized reciprocity. The gift economy assigns special value to "gifts of time and skill" (Hellekson 2009, 115)—gifts made by fans for other fans. The value of these gifts lies not only in their content or the social gesture of giving, but in the labor invested in creating them. The circulation of gifts among all kinds of fans focuses on generating and strengthening fandom network structure (Turk 2014). The fan gift economy operates in a way contrary to our usual understanding of work, with a basis in identity, connection, and production according to personal will. Nevertheless, online gift economy and commodity culture cannot be viewed as independent systems, as commodity culture has selectively exploited the spirit of gift economy for economic gain (Scott 2009).

[2.2] In addition to the accumulation of capital and ownership of commodities by the fan base, fan culture is also closely tied to the commercial interests of cultural industries. For the industry, fans represent an additional market—they not only purchase large numbers of derivative products but also provide valuable free feedback on market trends and preferences. The normalization and even celebration of contemporary media interactivity, along with the widespread adoption of "fan" as a label describing people and behaviors, seems to suggest that most consumers now behave like fans (Jenkins 2006; Sandvoss 2005) and fan desire is now producible and manageable (Stanfill 2019).

[2.3] Fan culture itself is influenced by two opposing sets of values that dominate the cultural sphere, and fans' positions align with these: profit-driven cultural values and cultural production for its own sake (Jones 2014). Liang and Shen (2016) define the fan economy as a profit-driven system generated through the interactions between individual fans, fan communities, and the artists or celebrities they follow. Such interactions form a mutually reinforcing network that drives the commercial success of music, film, and television products even prior to their official release. This relationship between fans and the cultural industries can be understood as a form of emotional capital—a resource built upon affective investment and loyalty. Hung (2020) further conceptualizes the fan economy as an operational model centered on consumers' emotional capital, through which industries leverage fans' attachment and devotion to celebrities or brands to achieve both economic and social returns.

3. Anti-fandom and cancel culture

[3.1] Fan and fandom are expanding concepts. Turk (2014) reminds us that in the fan economy, not all fans are capable of creating works. Nonproductive fans can also participate in the fan gift economy by engaging with the results of fan labor. Similarly, the fan economy is not solely built on positive appreciation and devoted fan groups. As Stanfill (2019) notes, from an industry perspective, the differences between fan cultures are gradually blurring, and the term "fan" has evolved into a general term for interactive consumers. Stein (2019) argues that fan communities are always a mix of love and hate. Both negative and positive emotions doubly influence fans' participation in media culture. Fans do not engage with media texts in isolation; rather, they view media texts and their surrounding fan culture as an ongoing, evolving dialogue that inevitably contains a series of fluctuating positive and negative emotions.

[3.2] Ahmed (2004) introduced the concept of hate economy, using economy to describe the circulation and distribution of emotions in social and psychological spheres. Building on Marxist concepts, Ahmed describes emotions as a form of capital; she argues that "emotions do not positively reside in signs or commodities, but are produced as effects of their circulation" (253). Ahmed further emphasizes that emotions do not circulate freely; some emotions more easily and powerfully stick, attach, and transfer to certain signs and bodies (especially those with historical connections to particular emotions). The objects of hate are crucial to the formation of collectives, while the expulsion or incorporation of the hated other is necessary for maintaining collective identity.

[3.3] Just as the hate economy constitutes one of the most salient and different manifestations of the affective economy, antifandom can be understood as a mode of practice that has emerged yet is distinct from traditional conceptions of fandom. Unlike the fannish anti identity that emphasizes the oppositional other categories of fans (TWC Editor 2022), the antifan concept follows Gray's (2003) pioneering formulation, defined as "those who strongly dislike a given text or genre, considering it inane, stupid, morally bankrupt and/or aesthetic drive" (70). Although research on aversion, disgust, and antifans is not new, this research has become increasingly important in the digital age. The development of online communication tools has promoted and expanded the scope and speed of participatory culture that develops around media texts. Gray (2003) mentions the behavior of hate-watching in antifandom, which refers to watching TV shows or movies you hate because you hate them. Hate-watching typically aims to judge and point out flaws according to spontaneous specific criteria and therefore could tell us about people's expectations and disappointments with the media (Gilbert 2019; Jane 2019).

[3.4] Antifans are also productive, as they create and circulate texts to express their feelings and views about specific programs, and these ongoing debates involve clashes at the level of civic political consciousness (Chatman 2017). Such productivity and political consciousness have given rise to several key characteristics of contemporary antifans (Jane 2019), including the increased complexity of antifan texts and significant expansions of audience reach; an explicit, violent, and directly threatening nature of antifan discourse; and antifandom's preference for ordinary targets rather than traditional celebrities. Mardon et al.'s (2023) ethnographic research uncovered that the emergence of antifandom may signify the dissolution of reciprocal and disclosive intimate relationships between consumers and celebrities, as well as the exploitative nature of commercial intimacy. Antifan identity helps establish an alternative, exploitation-free, and retaliatory intimate relationship with celebrities. Additionally, it suggests that while there are currently only cases of positive audience-celebrity relationships turning negative, this does not mean these negative relationships cannot transform back into positive ones.

[3.5] One category closely related to antifans is reactionary fans. Reactionism is a conceptual cluster describing a complex political orientation that combines emotions of resentment with a strong desire to return to an imagined past (Capelos et al. 2017). Reactionary fans point both to reactionary political causes articulated within fan cultures and to the increasing fanization of reactionary political movements themselves (Stanfill 2020). Reactionary fandom is not defined by an oppositional stance alone, but by a clearly articulated reactionary political orientation and by fan practices that seek to defend or reproduce existing relations of domination or structures of oppression. In contrast, antifandom does not make normative judgments about the nature of what is being opposed.

[3.6] Another accompanying phenomenon of antifandom is cancel culture. Clark (2020, 88) describes cancel culture as a form of agency expression and digital media oversight, referring to what happens when "one no longer wishes to grace [others] with their presence, time, and money." Cancellation/cancelling behaviors revolve around media, including social media posts, both those that explicitly use the word "cancelled" and those that convey the same meaning. Other cancellation behaviors include withdrawing public support for the target of cancellation, such as unfollowing them on social media, not purchasing products endorsed by the brand or celebrity being targeted, not watching the TV show/movie or listening to the music associated with it, and so on (Ng 2022). In her study of cancel culture, Ng (2022) mentions its similarities with antifandom but also points out that not all cancellation behaviors can be fully categorized within existing antifan theoretical frameworks, as the latter mainly focuses on how disgust or hatred sustains users' continued engagement with media texts, rather than completely abandoning it like in cancel culture. To a certain extent, antifans continue to proliferate in a form of negative growth, while cancel culture tends to diminish their economic gains to near zero. In other words, cancel culture represents antifans' further retaliatory action, serving as the ultimate resistance to and destruction of antifan objects.

4. Methodology

[4.1] I adopt an online observational participation approach to examine the evolution of fan discourses surrounding Mai Lin across three distinct phases: the initial controversy, the period of commercial consolidation, and the subsequent decline or crisis. Data were collected from three major social media platforms—Weibo, Rednote (Xiaohongshu), and BiliBili—which respectively represent spaces of real-time public debate and participatory audiovisual culture. I draw upon both textual data within online communities and field note data compiled through sustained observation.

[4.2] The observational period spans from October 2024 to May 2025, encompassing the full cycle of controversy, commercialization, and crisis surrounding Mai Lin's media exposure. The controversy began on October 24, 2024 following the airing of the second episode of See You Again, when Mai Lin's on-screen behavior first attracted public criticism. By November 9, 2024, with the release of the fourth episode, user-generated videos on Bilibili began to circulate widely, transforming her image into a viral subject. The situation escalated on November 30, 2024, as online users initiated a boycott of Mai Lin's commercial appearance.

[4.3] After the program's conclusion in January 2025, the cast reunited for a TikTok livestream on January 18, followed by a series of brand-affiliated livestream sessions featuring Mai Lin between January 19 and 24, during which she participated in e-commerce promotion activities. Throughout this period—from early November 2024 to late January 2025—livestreaming emerged as a central site for the convergence of fandom, antifandom, and commercial traffic. On February 25, 2025, an interview with a fellow cast member revealed that several of Mai Lin's endorsement opportunities had been cancelled. The controversy reignited on March 7, 2025, when calls to boycott Mai Lin's new reality show spread across platforms. In response, she issued a public apology letter on Weibo on March 13, 2025, marking a temporary resolution of the online dispute.

5. The antifan economy

[5.1] The analysis suggests that the antifan economy operates as a dynamic system of accumulation, sustained jointly by industry actors, social media influencers, and antifans, that unfolds across three main stages. The first stage is clickbait. At this stage, Mai Lin's rise to notoriety illustrates the core dynamics of the antifan economy in which negative attention is both generated and monetized. Her controversial behavior rapidly attracted public scrutiny, producing a sizable antifan audience within a short period.

[5.2] For example, during a group trip featured in the program, when the shared budget was managed by Mai and was close to being exhausted, Mai insisted on spending the remaining funds on expensive food without sufficient consultation, resulting in a shortage for subsequent meals. In addition, audiences criticized the way Mai appeared to ground her self-worth in her husband's feedback while simultaneously asserting dominance in the relationship through emotional outbursts and controlling behaviors. Based on these actions, antifans actively participated in meme creation, employing symbols, signs, and caricatures associated with Mai to express ridicule and criticism. Online discussions of her personality and private life became highly systematized and codified, humorously referred to by antifans as "Mai-ology." Notably, these user-generated memes were later incorporated into marketing strategies by the reality show and affiliated brands, effectively converting fan engagement into commercial visibility and merchandise sales.

[5.3] Beyond meme marketing, the phenomenon of rage-baiting to hate-watching emerged as a key driver of engagement. Many viewers reported subscribing to streaming platforms explicitly to follow Mai Lin's activities, despite—or because of—their negative sentiments. Dominant emotions among antifans included anger and irritation, often accompanied by a vicarious hope that the couple featured on the show would separate. Far from diminishing engagement, these affective responses sustained and intensified participation, motivating repeated viewing, online discussion, and content creation. In this way, the antifan economy mirrors many structural dynamics of traditional fan economies, yet operates through the affective circuits of hostility, ridicule, and moral judgment.

[5.4] As the controversy continued to escalate, a broader range of ordinary viewers from various platforms and media channels were drawn into the expanding antifan economy. Social media influencers—particularly those who rely on film commentary, entertainment news updates, and algorithm-driven content production—began to generate a substantial volume of videos centered on Mai. These creators dissected the reality show into short, easily consumable clips, integrated information from other sources, and produced commentary videos marked by explicitly negative affect. Such content typically denounced Mai's perceived wrongdoing or offered speculative psychological analyses, guiding viewers to reaffirm their own sense of moral superiority in contrast to her constructed persona.

[5.5] Importantly, many of these influencers already possessed sizeable followings and considerable online visibility. By attracting their own audiences into the emerging antifan community, they significantly amplified the visibility and circulation of Mai-related content. Consequently, both the reality show itself and the proliferating memes associated with Mai were disseminated across a much wider cross-platform network, further embedding the controversy within the attention economy.

[5.6] The second phase is clout. Building on the visibility generated by antifan engagement, Mai Lin actively leveraged her notoriety to participate in the economy of mockery. She conducted personal livestreams in which she received virtual gifts and promoted products, strategically incorporating user-generated memes of herself to attract attention and sustain audience engagement. The reality show similarly capitalized on her popularity and meme recognition, directly marketing products inspired by these viral symbols. This interplay demonstrates how mockery and commercial gain can coexist, with negative attention transformed into tangible economic value.

[5.7] A notable example is the widely discussed Smoked Chicken Incident, which originated from a relatively minor moment in the reality show. As part of the program's structure, Mai was appointed as the financial officer responsible for managing the collective living expenses of all three couples during the road trip throughout the show. Despite the strict budget constraints, she purchases two smoked chickens exclusively for her own consumption. This decision was quickly framed online as emblematic of her perceived irresponsibility and self-centeredness.

[5.8] The smoked chicken subsequently underwent rapid memefication, circulating as a symbol of Mai's alleged misconduct and becoming a recurring visual and textual shorthand within antifan discourse. This memetic spread unexpectedly stimulated a surge in consumer interest, as users began purchasing the exact same brand of smoked chicken—either ironically, performatively, or simply out of curiosity fueled by the viral discourse. On Tmall, a major Chinese online shopping platform, the brand's flagship store capitalized on the controversy by labeling its product as "Mai's Smoked Chicken from See You Again," directly tying its marketing strategy to the reality show and its associated meme culture. By November 11, 2024, online sales had exceeded 8,000 units, representing an approximately hundredfold increase in volume (Zhang 2024).

[5.9] In the last phase of collapse, however, the dynamics of engagement shifted when broader audience expectations were unmet. Contrary to some antifans' desires, Mai and her partner Li's divorce did not occur. This sparked widespread disappointment among antifans, many of whom realized their invested attention had failed to yield returns. Particularly infuriating was the sense of betrayed expectations stemming from the couple's unresolved issues being swept under the carpet. This promoted a wave of boycott campaigns targeting Li's commercial appearances as well as Mai's subsequent reality show projects. Fans withdrew viewership and refused to contribute to the program's visibility, marking a transition from casual curiosity and irritation to overt anger, rejection, and moral sanctioning. This phase reflects the convergence of antifandom with cancel culture, wherein affective investment transforms into active resistance, disrupting both media circulation and the commercial strategies that rely on visibility—even infamy.

6. Conclusion

[6.1] I demonstrate that, akin to the traditional fan economy, the antifan economy capitalizes on the emotional labor of audiences. In this context, the deliberate cultivation and amplification of antifandom function strategically as a form of marketing rather than emerging solely from audience initiative. Within this economic cycle, multiple actors—including audiences, reality show producers, commercial brands, social media influencers, and even the celebrities themselves—actively participate, facilitating the direct conversion of affective engagement into monetary value.

[6.2] It is worth noting, however, that the antifan economy is not an inexhaustible wellspring of wealth; ironic consumption grants audiences a relatively shallower investment and greater agency. Audience agency is revealed not only in their capacity to recognize the uncompensated exploitation inherent in this system but also in their ability to strategically mobilize antifan practices into acts of cancel culture. This analysis underscores the complex interplay between visibility, affect, and commercialization in contemporary digital media, highlighting the economic and sociocultural significance of antifandom as both a site of agency and a mechanism of market circulation.

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Symposium

Clickbait, clout, and collapse: The life cycle of the antifan economy

Yifei Yang